The GPs have generally received a positive reception by the international community and have become a sort of common reference point in the area of business and human rights. States, national human rights institutions, multi-stakeholder initiatives, companies, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and academics have invoked them in diverse ways. 4 However, do the Framework and the GPs adequately address the challenges that arise in considering the relationship between business and human rights? Barring a few exceptions, 5 both these documents have not received a detailed or systematic critical evaluation. This book seeks to fill this gap.
It does so by subjecting the Framework and the GPs to rigorous scrutiny against four key questions that arise in the area of business and human rights. 6 The first question relates to the process undertaken and the methodology adopted by the SRSG that led to the final products: the Framework and the GPs. What did the SRSG do differently to achieve the unanimous endorsement of the GPs by the HRC, a feat that no previous UN-led initiative could accomplish? What is the nature and extent of the 'consensus' that the GPs are said to represent? Were the deeply divisive and contested issues surrounding business and human rights intentionally bypassed to sustain the project of building the consensus? Did the goal of achieving a consensus and securing the support of the business community override the goal of developing a robust regulatory framework of corporate accountability for human rights violations? In other words, did 'principled pragmatism' undermine the cause of subjecting business to the mandate of international human rights law?
The second key question concerns the normative grounding of the Framework and the GPs. This question has two components: what is the source of bindingness of corporate obligations; and why ought businesses to have human rights obligations? In relation to the first component, we are concerned with the question of whether these obligations are merely voluntary and should be rooted in 'social expectations'. Moreover, can human rights norms be 'binding' other than in a legal sense? The second component requires us to develop a reasoned account of why corporations ought to have obligations for the realisation of human rights. This is a question of political philosophy and requires engagement with the moral bases for corporations to be bound by particular obligations.
The third question relates to the actual content of the obligations that corporations have in relation to human rights. In other words, what is (or ought to be) the extent of corporate human rights obligations? This is a complex area to navigate and raises several sub-questions. What is the justifiable division of responsibility between the state and corporations? Do corporations merely have the responsibility to respect human rights or do they also have positive obligations to protect and fulfil human rights? What are the responsibilities of corporations for the actions of third parties -from state agencies to subsidiaries and suppliers -with whom they are connected? The issue of complicity, especially for companies operating in conflict zones or where repressive and authoritarian regimes are in power, poses a number of conundrums which require systematic attention.
The fourth and final question concerns how to make companies accountable for human rights violations. How could the obstacles that victims experience in access to justice be overcome? Is it adequate to rely primarily on states or the 'courts of public opinion' to hold corporations accountable for violations of human rights? What forms of alternative remedies are likely to provide effective relief for victims of human rights abuses? More importantly, do the measures proposed by the GPs empower victims adequately to take on the mighty multinational corporations (MNCs)? How does one deal with companies that fail to live up to the 'due diligence' recommendations outlined in the GPs?
We organise the discussion in this introductory chapter as well as the parts of the book around these four questions. In the second section of this chapter, we consider briefly the historical backdrop of the UN's engagement with the issue of business and human rights. This should help readers to contextualise the SRSG's mandate. The third section then offers a critical introduction to the key features of the Framework and the GPs. The fourth section provides a brief outline of the chapters in this volume and their authors' views about the adequacy of the responses of the Framework and the GPs to the four questions identified above. Finally, we conclude by briefly considering some of the outstanding issues and a possible way forward for developing further the human rights obligations of business.
The book does not claim that the Framework and the GPs are devoid of any merit. Nevertheless, we believe that critical insights will be vital to further the cause of putting in place a robust framework regarding the human rights obligations of companies. While a book of this length cannot possibly cover all aspects of the Framework and the GPs, it covers a range of issues in a systematic way. We do hope that more such critical inquiries will follow. These critical engagements should help, amongst others, the UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights 'to explore options and make recommendations . . . for enhancing access to effective remedies available to those whose human rights are affected by corporate activities'.
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A few signposts are necessary regarding the terminology used in this book. Although the debate at times was personified by John Ruggie, we have generally used the term 'SRSG' to indicate that the recommendations emerged from a UN mandate and to ensure that any critiques should not be taken in an ad hominem manner. Also, the contributors to this volume have not generally maintained as sharp a distinction between 'responsibility' and 'duty/obligation' as was done by the SRSG. And we use the terms 'corporation' and 'company' interchangeably to refer to all forms of business entities that have human rights obligations.
The UN's engagement with business and human rights: a historical context
It might be useful to review at the outset the history and context 8 in which the SRSG was invited to break the stalemate in the UN's quest to establish a regulatory framework concerning the human rights responsibilities of business. impact of their activities on society (which was the initial focus of the UN in this area) can, broadly, be divided into three phases. Apart from the timespan, the three phases differ from each other in terms of the focus of engagement, the key participating actors, and the driving force for such an engagement.
The first phase: MNCs' rights versus responsibilities
The first phase can be traced back to the early 1970s when the UN's Economic and Social Council requested the Secretary-General to constitute a Group of Eminent Persons to study the impact of MNCs on the development process (especially in developing countries) and international relations. 11 The Group recommended that the UN establish a Commission on MNCs, which, amongst other things, should formulate a code of conduct for them. 12 The quest to establish an agreeable code under the aegis of the Commission continued for more than a decade, but the Draft Code of 1990 could not be adopted due to various disagreements between developed and developing countries. 13 It is arguable that the first phase ended in the early 1990s with the suspension of negotiations on the Code and the renaming of the Commission on MNCs as the Commission on International Investment and Transnational Corporations.
14 During the first phase, the proposed code sought to deal with both responsibilities (linked to MNCs' activities) and rights (linked to MNCs' treatment by host states). For obvious reasons, whereas developing countries were more interested in solidifying their right to regulate MNCs and outlining the responsibilities of MNCs, developed countries were keener to secure a level playing field for their MNCs operating in emerging markets. Consistent with the then prevailing view of international law, states were the principal actors which pushed for such a code and negotiated its content.
Writing in 2007, the SRSG asserted that '[h]uman rights did not feature' in the code formulation initiative of this phase. 15 This assertion does not seem to be correct, because paragraph 14 of the Draft Code of 1990 had stated that MNCs 'shall respect human rights and fundamental rights and fundamental freedoms in the countries in which they operate'. 16 The SRSG was probably misled by the fact that the Draft Code, unlike the similar instruments drafted in the next two phases, did not focus exclusively on the human rights responsibilities of MNCs. But this does not mean that human rights issues were not on the discussion table during the first phase.
The second phase: between voluntarism and binding obligations
The second phase of the UN's engagement with MNCs' activities began at the end of the twentieth century when the UN became concerned with the impact of globalisation as well as of MNCs on the realisation of human rights. Taking leads from the paper submitted by Mr El-Hadji Guisse on the impact of MNCs on the realisation of economic, social and cultural rights, 17 in August 1998 the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights decided to establish a five-member Working Group on the Working Methods and Activities of Transnational Corporations.
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While the Working Group was still mapping its future course, on 31 January 1999, at the World Economic Forum in Davos, the then UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, proposed the Global Compact originally consisting of nine principles in the areas of human rights, labour, and the environment. 19 This was a clear attempt on the part of the UN to re-engage with non-state actors and push for a 'public-private' partnership to make globalisation more inclusive and equitable. 20 The Global Compact, which was officially launched in 2000 and became popular with corporations, received significant criticism from human rights advocates for being too vague and providing nothing more than voluntary moral guidance to companies. 21 Against the backdrop of these criticisms, the Working Group drafted detailed substantive provisions as to the human rights responsibilities of MNCs and other business enterprises and also incorporated provisions for the implementation of these responsibilities. 22 In mid-2003, it presented to the Sub-Commission the final draft of the Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights (UN Norms). 23 The UN Norms unsurprisingly attracted criticism from several leading MNCs and business organisations. Although the Sub-Commission approved the UN Norms, 24 the Commission on Human Rights in its 2004 session resolved, much to the satisfaction of the business community, that the UN Norms have 'no legal standing'. 25 The Commission then, in its 2005 session, requested the UN Secretary-General to appoint a Special Representative on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations. 26 This resolution effectively drew the curtain on the second phase in that it did not even refer to the UN Norms. 27 In comparison with the first phase, the primary focus of the second phase -which lasted for a much shorter period than the first phase -was on cataloguing the human rights responsibilities of MNCs and other business enterprises. The omission of MNCs' rights from the drafting debate during this period could be explained by the proliferation of bilateral investment treaties since the 1990s, 28 and the establishment of the World Trade Organisation in 1995. These two developments allowed MNCs to demand, in various forums, directly or through their home states, fair and equal treatment from host states. It did not, therefore, remain equally critical to catalogue the rights of MNCs. Another notable difference between the first two phases was that, unlike in the first phase, MNCs, business organisations and NGOs played an active role in the second phase in mobilising opinion for or against the UN Norms. This provided good evidence of the emerging importance of non-state actors in moulding the contours of international law.
The third phase: principled pragmatism or business in the driving seat?
The third phase began in July 2005 with the appointment of John Ruggie as the SRSG and is ongoing, with the constitution of the Working Group tasked with the responsibility to disseminate and implement the GPs still underway. During the six years of his mandate, the SRSG conducted wide-ranging consultations, participated in meetings with diverse organisations, gave numerous speeches, prepared several reports, proposed the Framework and drafted the GPs. While it will not be possible to review all the SRSG reports here, we highlight how this phase differed from the previous two phases. Firstly, extensive consultation with a wide range of stakeholders (perhaps with the exception of victims of human rights abuses) was a defining feature of this phase. In fact, this phase illustrated how nonstate actors such as MNCs, NGOs and individual scholars could play an even more vital role than states in developing international law norms from the 'bottom up'. 29 Secondly, this 'bottom-up' approach of international law-making allowed MNCs and business organisations to play an unprecedented role in defining the contours of rules that were to apply to them. The business sector not only enjoyed proximity to the SRSG, 30 be opposed by the business community, but also would drive progressive business leaders, who are willing to engage with the Compact, into a more uniform anti-code coalition'. 35 In short, the approach adopted by the SRSG in the third phase has undone the contribution that the UN Norms sought to make in marking a clear departure from merely voluntary regulation and the over-reliance on the states' role in regulating MNCs.
Key features of the Framework and the GPs
This section outlines some of the key elements that defined the work and output of the SRSG's mandate, in particular the Framework and the GPs. We engage with these key features in a critical manner, seeking to show both a number of shortcomings and omissions in the work of the SRSG.
Process: consensus without content?
One distinguishing feature of the SRSG's mandate was the process adopted by him. The first important element of this process was the adoption of an explicitly consultative approach. The SRSG perhaps learned a lesson from the failure of the UN Norms, which had been criticised for failing to engage with a wide range of stakeholders. The wide-ranging consultations conducted by the SRSG undoubtedly enhanced the legitimacy of the mandate to set norms and outline expectations that society has from both states and companies. Even if not all stakeholders had the same kind of impact on the text of the Framework and the GPs, they at least had a sense of participation in what was unfolding. A black spot in relation to this legitimacy, however, was the SRSG's reluctance to engage in any direct consultation with victims of corporate human rights abuses. Despite many calls by civil society for him to meet victims, the SRSG took a strategic decision at the outset to keep a distance from the victims of corporate human rights abuses. This allowed him to avoid the process becoming an adversarial battle between NGOs and MNCs.
Consultations were not carried out merely to acquire legitimacy. They were also employed to build consensus -the second key aspect of the process. The SRSG did not try to impose on companies human rights
